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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Appellee, 
vs. 
TROY N. PASSEY, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 920267-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-
3(2)(d) ("...appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court."). See, State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464,467 (Utah 
1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was defendant's submission to the taking of a blood sample involuntary ? 
2. Was defendant's submission to the taking of a blood sample a product of his 
unlawful arrest? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The trial court's findings of fact are entitled to deference and are to be reviewed 
under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255,1258, and n.5 
(Utah 1987). Questions of law are to be reviewed by this court for correctness. Scharf 
v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions are at issue in this case: 
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Constitution of Utah, Article t, Section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant defers to the statement of the case from his original brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Trooper David Popelmayer of the Utah Highway Patrol was called as a witness 
by the prosecution. Upon cross examination he testified that he had no contact with Mr. 
Passey until after he had been placed in the ambulance, while Trooper Popelmayer was 
standing outside at the foot of the ambulance., at which time he allegedly smelled an 
odor of alcohol (T.9,11). At that time, based only on an odor of alcohol, he formulated 
the opinion that Mr. Passey was under the influence of alcohol. (T.11) 
Trooper Hogan of the Utah Highway Patrol was then called as a witness by the 
prosecution. At that time he testified that when he arrived at the hospital he 
immediately placed Mr. Passey under arrest and did not speak to hirn until he requested 
that Mr. Passey submit to a blood test. 
After arguments by respective counsel on the issue of probable cause to arrest, 
the trial court ruled that, 
,!
...there was not probable cause for an arrest, simply upon the basis of an 
accident together with an odor of alcohol. So let's see if the Court of Appeals 
agrees with me or not, but I think odor and accident is insufficient..." (T. 39) 
However, the court did not dismiss the case, but instead continued with the proceedings 
and denied the Motion to Suppress Blood Test Results, thereby allowing the blood test 
results into evidence even though they were obtained after the illegal arrest. 
Testimony and arguments were also heard relating to defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Blood Test Results. Trooper Popelmayer testified that he asked Trooper 
Hogan to go to the hospital, place Mr. Passey under arrest and witness the 
administration of the blood test. He had no further contact with Mr. Passey. 
Trooper Hogan testified that upon arriving at the hospital, Mr. Passey was being 
tended to by the doctors. When given the opportunity, he placed Mr. Passey under 
arrest and read him the ".08" admonition stating that if he refused to submit to the test 
he could lose his license for a year. He then witnessed the blood draw as requested, 
read Mr. Passey his Miranda rights, wrote up a citation for driving under the influence 
and left. Respective counsel then argued the motion at which time the trial court denied 
the Motion to Suppress Blood Test Results. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Voluntary submission to the taking of a blood test is a question of fact to be 
determined by the totality of the circumstances. Further, the State must apply the 
requirements of State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) in proving that the 
consent was voluntary. In this case the appellant's arrest was found to be invalid, yet 
the blood test results were admitted into evidence. However, the above mentioned 
requirements were not met; therefore, the trial court's findings should be found to be 
clearly erroneous and in error, and should be reversed and remanded back to the trial 
court. 
ARGUMENT 
The appellee contends that appellant's consent to the blood test was voluntary 
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even though appellant's arrest was clearly invalid, as the trial court found. However, 
appellant contends that the consent was involuntary and coercive in nature and that due 
to this the blood test results are invalid. 
"The question of whether a consent to a search was in fact Voluntary1 or 
was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of 
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." State v. 
Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah Ct.App. 1990)(quoting Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 277, 93 S.Ct 2041, 2047-48, 36 LEd.2d 854 
(1973). 
Appellee contends that, 
"...appellant's consent was voluntary because it was given in the neutral 
environment of a hospital as opposed to a police station, and because no 
threats accompanied the request for the appellant's consent." 
However, when the "totality of the circumstances" are viewed, it paints quite a different 
picture from appellee's contentions of the hospital as a "neutral environment" which was 
void of "threats" accompanying the request for consent. Additionally, appellee's 
observations are speculation at best. He lists no grounds for his observations, yet 
expects this Court to assume they are valid. In State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991), this Court held that, 
"In sustaining its burden that voluntary consent was given the State must 
meet its burden of proof: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent 
was 'unequivocal and specific1 and 'freely and intelligently given'; 
(2) the government must prove consent was given without duress 
or coercion, express or implied; 
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be 
convincing evidence that such rights were waived." 
(citing State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting United States v. 
Abbott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977). 
If the Sterger requirements are applied in this case, and the facts are viewed in total it 
will be clear that appellee has not met his burden of proof, with regard to the appellant's 
alleged voluntary submission, nor complied with the Sterger requirements. First, 
appellant was under arrest, in custody and not free to leave the hospital at the time of 
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the request to consent to the blood test, therefore, the hospital was not a "neutral 
environment" as the appellee suggests. Further, the officer informed the appellant that 
if he refused to consent to the test he would lose his license for a year. Those elements 
put the appellant under a great amount of pressure, duress and coercion. Either he 
submit to the test or lose his license for a year. 
Second, appellant's response to the officer's request could never be construed to 
be "unequivocal and specific" nor "freely and intelligently given." Trooper Hogan, the 
officer who requested the blood test testified that the appellant allegedly agreed to the 
blood draw, (T. 23), yet there were no questions asked of him as to how the appellant 
actually made his consent known. Therefore, it is only mere speculation on the part of 
the trial court and the appellee that the appellant actually specifically consented to the 
blood test, freely and intelligently and without coercion. Subsequently, appellee's 
speculation can hardly be relied upon as convincing evidence of appellant's alleged 
voluntary submission to the blood test results. Further, the trial court's findings relied 
upon this speculation as well as should therefore be found to be clearly erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the appellee relied upon hearsay and speculation, not relevant and 
substantial evidence, and due to the prosecution's failure to follow the guidelines 
outlined in Sterger, there is no reliable evidence that the appellant's consent to the 
blood test was voluntary. As a result, the trial court's denial of the appellant's motion to 
suppress the blood test results was clearly in error. Therefore, this Court should 
reverse the decision and remand the case back to the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 23rd day of November, 1992. 
^ L 
L/tong 
Attorney for Appellai 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Larry Long, hereby certify that eight copies of the foregoing will be mailed to 
the Utah Court of Appeals and that four copies of the foregoing will be mailed to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's office at 2001 South State, #S3700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190, 
this 23rd day of November, 1992. 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
TROY N. PASSEY, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 912014290 TC 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 12th day of February, 
1992, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before 
the HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THORNE, sitting as Judge in the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: MR. KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, #3500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
For the Defendant: MR. LARRY LONG 
Attorney at Law 
39 East Exchange Place, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705 
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P R O C E E D I N G _S I 
i 
i 
i 
i 
THE COURT: We have State of Utah vs. j 
Troy Passey. Is Mr. Passey here? Okay. 
LMR. UPDEGROVE: I'll get Larry. 
(Off the record.) 
THE COURT: Gentlemen, are you ready to ; 
go forward with this? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Yes, your Honor. Kenneth : 
Updegrove for the State. ; 
MR. LONG: Larry Long for the defendant. ; 
i 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Long, itfs your | 
! 
motion. What-- j 
MR. LONG: Well, there are several motions ; 
involved. Do you think it would pay us to sort them out and I 
maybe deal with them a category at a time? We might be j 
handle some of these quite summarily. 
i 
Or we could start with the evidentiary ; 
hearing, I think the critical part of that is the motion in i 
limine-- j 
THE COURT: Let's do the evidentiary I 
hearing, then we can have—let the witnesses be on their way j 
or they can stay and watch, if they want, but letfs not hold 
them here unnecessarily. t 
MR. LONG: All right. I have prepared a j 
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supplemental memo. May I approach the bench? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, in the interest] 
of judicial economy, why don't I just put on my officer and j 
start it. i 
THE COURT: That sounds like a good way to \ 
I 
do it. ! 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Call, let's see, it was i 
Dave Popemayer that was the trooper. j 
THE COURT: Trooper, do you want to come j 
i 
up, please, and raise your right hand. j 
DAVID POPELMAYER, ! 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this 
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the witness) 
stand, and was examined and testified as follows: 
(Whereupon, the Court handled an unrelated matter.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove, back on the 
Passey matter. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thanks, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. UPDEGROVE: 
Q Would you please state your name and spell your last 
name? 
A David Popelmayer, P-o-p-e-l-m-a-y-e-r. 
Q By whom are you employed, sir? 
3 
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exc 
the 
A The 
lusionary ] 
courtroom 
stop? 
the stop. 
draw. 
in 
Mr. 
terms < 
Long, 
your word 
critical; 
exc 
the 
my 
luded, 
Utah 
rule? 
, and 
of what th 
and 
for 
if 
but 
I don 
that. 
Highway Pat 
MR. 
I V 
perhc 
THE 
MR. 
LONG : 
rol. 
Your Honor, may we invoke the J 
ast noticed there's another officer in 1 
aps--
COURT: 
I 
Is that--were you part of the 
UPDEGROVE: Well, he was no part 
UNIDENTIFIED OFFICER: Well, I was--
MR. 
MR. 
i 
of 1 
| 
i 
UPDEGROVE: He witnessed the blood j 
LONG : 
e officers 
THE COURT: 
1 
i 
i 
i 
The whole question is critical i 
saw and observed. 
Well, I've heard that be-
't know that--I don't know that I can 
MR. 
THE 
I remember 
she d 
machine worked. 
experience 
MR. 
THE 
idn'' 
MR. 
has been, 
LONG: 
COURT: 
right, 
LONG: 
COURT: 
t testi 
LONG : 
Well, I mean--
You've told me something 
1 
fore, 
take I 
was 
! 
it was Ms. McGregor's testimony-] 
Uh huh, I remember that. 
--and that she needed to 
fy to any facts other than 
Well, that's part's true, 
especially with Ms. McGregor, sh< 
4 
be 
how 
but j 
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sits here and listens to, what the testimony of the officers 
is and tl 
stand is-
ten she--her whole examination when she gets on the 
i 
— i 
THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove, if—to I 
accommodate Mr, Long, you want the other officer to wait j 
outside, 
Q 
that's fine; but I'm not going to order him out. 1 
i 1 
Go ahead. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Okay. j 
j 
(By Mr. Updegrove) How long have you been with the 1 
Highway Patrol? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
training 
A 
Q 
A 
It will be eight years in August. ; 
And are you a Category One peace officer? 
Yes .. I am . 
And the normal training in--at POST and after 
you receive each year? 
Yes, sir. 
And what are your duties, sir? ! 
To enforce the laws of the State of Utah, to 
investigate accidents, to handle any kind of criminal 
incident. 
Q 
training 
A 
I've had 
And please, for just a minute or so, go into your 
in accident investigation. 
I've had the basic accident investigation course, 
a couple of refresher courses, as far as accident 
investigation is concerned. 
5 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
Q And how many accidents have you investigated, 
approximately? 
A Oh, in seven-and-a-half years, well over a thousand. 
Q All right, sir. Were you on duty in the evening of 
the 27th of October of 1991? 
A Yes. I was. 
Q Did you happen to be dispatched to SR-215 west of 
approximately 4400 South? 
A Yes. I was. 
Q Is that location in Salt Lake County? 
A It is. 
Q What did you find there, sir? 
A I--when I arrived, I observed a blue pickup truck 
that was in the culvert that would be just west of 1-215. 
Q And how did that truck get there, sir? 
A From the marks that were on the grass, the weeds, 
and also the—the damage that was in the path of this vehicle, 
I observed that that vehicle had to have come from southbound 
on 1-215 and then went off the right side of the road. 
Q Did you file an accident report? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q Would you please go to the board and draw the scene 
as you saw it? 
A This will not be to scale. 
What there is is, there's a right-hand emergency 
6 
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lane here, and then this represents the edge of the concrete. 
There is a culvert, a cement culvert that sits off the side 
of the road, with a chainlink fence that runs — runs down and j 
i 
then there's a gate that is right here and it runs down, 
continues on down this way. 
There is also a four-position sign that sits off
 : 
the side of the rode, a four pole sign that sits off the ; 
side of the road. 
When I arrived-- ; 
THE COURT: When you say four-pole sign— 
i 
THE WITNESS: Highway-- j 
THE COURT: You mean highway information 
sign or a billboard? 
THE WITNESS: —road sign, yes. No, it was 
a highway information sign. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
j 
THE WITNESS: The creek or the canal runs ! 
j 
off at somewhat of an angle to this, not perpendicular to the 
i 
freeway, it runs towards an angle a bit. 
j 
When I arrived, there was a blue pickup ! 
truck that was sitting down in the creek, it was on its wheels j 
; 
in the water. I observed that this part of the chainlink j 
i 
fence and a portion of this part had been damaged. I also j 
i 
i 
observed that one of the legs on the four-legged sign had been J 
j 
damaged also. J 
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snow 
There were marks in the grass and in the 
that looked similar to this right here. 
leg on 
off, or 
poles. 
up. 
tion: 
were 
Q 
> 
A 
Q 
A 
THE 
the pole, or the 
COURT: And Officer, when you say the 
pole for the sign was damaged; sheared | 
was it scratched or-- | 
i 
THE 
THE 
THE 
THE 
THE 
MR. 
i 
WITNESS: They're--they!re break-away j 
COURT: Okay. \ 
WITNESS: And it had—it had bent it 
COURT: Okay. 
WITNESS: Is what it had done. 
UPDEGROVE: Thank you. 
(By Mr. Updegrove) Did you conduct an investiga- 1 
Yes. I did. 
How did you do that, sir? 
I--I observed 
several cars there 
standin 
approac 
told me 
of the 
g j ust, it would 
hed those people 
yes, they were. 
At that time, 
some people that were standing—there j 
when I arrived. I observed some peopl^ 
be north of the accident scene. I 
, asked if they were witnesses, they 
I then talked with these witnesses. 
they were just getting the driver out 
vehicle. They had taken the driver from the vehicle in 
to an ambulance, we had called LifeFlight, who--they were 
8 1 
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waiting to land, there on the freeway. 
Could I stop you for a second, please? 
Did you get information from these witnesses? 
Yes. I did. I 
i I 
Did the information from the witnesses match the j 
j 
physical evidence at the scene? ! 
A Yes. It did. | 
j 
Q Okay. Continue. j 
j 
A Okay. As they--they got the driver out of the j 
vehicle, moved him to the ambulance, I approached the j 
ambulance. I asked if they had--if the people in the ambulance! 
had his driver's license, asked for any kind of identification. 
They had said no. They removed a wallet from the pants that | 
the subject was wearing. I 
I was standing on the step of the ambulance at the 
back, at the bottom of the subject's feet, as he was laying i 
in the ambulance. 
They then handed me a wallet that came out of the | 
trousers of the individual that was laying on the gurney. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry to interrupt. When 
you say it came out; somebody had taken it out of the pants? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Did it fall out? 
THE WITNESS: One of the ambulance 
personnel took it out of the pants. 
9 
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Q 
A 
Q 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Updegrove) Was there a driver's license in 
it? 
A Yes . There was . 
Q And did the driver's license--did you observe, 
look at the driver's'license? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q And did the picture on the driver's license match 
the individual you saw on the gurney? 
A Yes. It did. 
Q And what was the name? 
A It was Troy N. Passey. 
Q And did you get a good look at that individual? 
A Yes. I did, as he was laying in the ambulance. 
Q And is he here in Court today? 
A Yes. He is. 
Q Would you please point him out and describe what 
he's wearing? 
A He's sitting at the defense table, he's got a black 
tie, white shirt, with a gray suit coat. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, may the record 
reflect that the witness has identified the defendant? 
THE COURT: Record will so reflect. 
Q (By Mr. Updegrove) Now, going back to the truck, 
did you observe any other injured persons around? 
10 
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A No. I did not. 
Q Did you see anybody m the truck besides the j 
defendant? I 
A No. I did not. ! 
Q Okay. Did you make any observations of the 
defendant!s condition? 
A When he was in the ambulance, yes, I did. s 
Q And what was that, sir? ; 
A Standing at the back of the ambulance, at his feet, ; 
i 
I could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage. 
I 
Q And please describe the weather conditions that day. 
A They—I know it was cold. I don't believe that it 
was snowing. But I — well, I know it was cold, I don't recall. 
I don't have my check book here to—to decipher the— 
Q Did you see any other accidents in that location? 
A Pardon me? 
Q Did you see any other accidents in that location? 
A No. I did not. 
Q Now, after you made your observations of the smell 
of alcoholic beverage, what did you do then, sir? 
A Based on the comments that—from the witnesses that 
I had, the physical evidence that was out on the roadway, and 
also the odor of an alcoholic beverage, I then asked, and 
I don't believe—I don't remember if it was by radio or in 
person, I asked Trooper Hogan if he would go up to the 
11 
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hospital where Ilr. Passey had been transported by LifeFliqht, 
and if he would then place the subject under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol and witness the blood 
draw. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Mr. Long? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LONG: 
Q Let's see, I believe your—when you were dispatched 
to the scene, it was ]ust an accident; is that right? 
A As far as I was aware, yes. 
Q Did you--
A An injury accident. 
Q And you heard some conversation through dispatch 
about LifeFlight coming in? 
A That was after I arrived at the scene. 
Q I see. So, was any other officer there when you 
arrived? 
A Yes. I believe there was. I know I wasn't the 
first one there. 
Q I see. And do you know who the other officer was? 
A I believe it was Trooper Allen Kaufman had arrived 
first, and he had Trooper Robin Wilkms, who was in the same 
vehicle, riding with him. 
Q Robin Williams? 
12 
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 r 
A Wilkins. I 
i \ 
Q WiIkins. \ 
And did they leave subsequently, then, or-- j 
A Some time after, yes. I'm not exactly sure when ! 
they left. 
Q They were not involved in investigating the 
accident or-- i 
A No. They were not. 
Q You were in charge? j 
A I was--I was the graveyard car that night, and they 
were in the process of going off duty. 
Q And you--that makes you in charge of the accident 
investigation? 
A Yes, it does. 
Q Okay. And when you arrived, there paramedics were 
already there, apparently? 
A Yes. They were. 
Q I see. And they were working, trying to get 
Mr. Passey out of the car? 
A Yes, they were. When I arrived. 
Q Okay. And so you had no contact with him until he 
was in the ambulance; is that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q And when he was in the ambulance, you smelled an 
odor of alcohol? 
13 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
then from 
A 
Q 
It would have been alcoholic beverage, yes. j 
I see. And you were at the door of the ambulance? j 
Correct. 
And you were at his feet? 
Correct. 
And so you were approximately four or five feet ; 
his feet, when you smelled this? 
I was—I was standing right at his feet. 
I see. Okay. And you--this alcoholic beverage was ; 
just coming from his person, you thought? j 
i 
A 
Q 
A 
face, but 
that time 
Q 
remnants < 
A 
if that p 
Q 
wounds? 
A 
It appeared to me, yes. ; 
And were the paramedics working on an open wounds? j 
i 
Not—I believe he did have some open wounds on his 
i 
I couldn't tell you if they were working on any at 
i 1 
1 
This scar on his left cheek, would that reflect the 
of the wound? 
I would believe so. I'm not—I can't say for sure 
articular scar is part of the accident or not. 
And don't they generally use alcohol to clean 
They—they use alcohol, yes; I don't know if they 
did at that time. 
Q 
what type 
I understand. Did you ask any of the paramedics \ 
of treatment they'd rendered for Mr. Passey o r — 
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never had 
hosp 
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Q 
ital; 
That 
Did 
them that he'd 
had 
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A 
said 
Q 
Not 
that, 
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a discussion with Mr. 
is that correct? 
is correct. 
the paramedics tell y 
fallen asleep at the 
, you asked Mr. Passey 
Passey until you were 
ou that Mr. Passey had 
wheel? 
that I recall, the paramedics told me that 
not that I recall. 
you wrote down in your DUI report form that 
arrest statement was, 1 fell as 
A That 
I had gone up 
Q 
A 
Q 
But 
That 
So, 
was--that statement 
to the hospital. 
he already arrested w 
is correct. 
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was told, I believe, a 
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A That is correct. 
Q So, you—you had no information from Mr. Passey as 
to a reasonable explanation for this accident other than that I 
he was intoxicated; is that right? j 
A I had not. spoken with Mr. Passey prior to him going ' 
to the hospital. j 
MR. LONG: No further questions. j 
THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove, anything else? ! 
i 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION j 
i 
BY MR . JJPDEGROVE : j 
Q Now, you--you went to the hospital after the-- ! 
after you were through with your investigation? J 
A Yes. I did. 
Q What did you observe there, sir? j 
MR. LONG: Your Honor, I don't think it j 
has any relevance to the motion here today because we're 
only talking about pvibable cause to arrest. Anything that 
happened after that is irrelevant. j 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Okay. I— j 
i 
THE COURT: Okay. You can step down. j 
Thank you. 
Mr. Updegrove? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Trooper Hogan. 
MR. LONG: I don't believe Trooper Hogan j 
has anything to offer at all, because he didn't even find j 
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Mr. Passey until he was at the hospital, and all he did was 
arrest him. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Mr.--or Trooper Hogan is 
the one that arrested him. 
THE COURT: Itfs up to Mr. Updegrove, if 
he needs that to present what he believes to be probable 
cause. 
If you'd come forward and raise your right 
hand, please, sir. 
LARRY HOGAN, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this 
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the 
witness stand, and was examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Come up and have a seat, 
please. 
Mr. Updegrove? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thank you, sir. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. UPDEGROVE: 
Q Would you please state your name and spell your 
last name? 
A Trooper Larry Hogan, H-o-g-a-n. 
Q And by whom are you employed, sir? 
A Utah Highway Patrol. 
Q And how long have you been so employed? 
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A N i n e t e e n y e a r s . 
Q C a t e g o r y O n e p e a c e o f f i c e r ? 
A Y e s . I a m . 
Q And have you had the normal training subsequent to 
POST? 
A Yes. I have. 
Q Officer, on the late evening of the 27th of October 
of last year, were you dispatched to L.D.S. Hospital? 
A Yes. 1 was. 
Q For what reason, sir? 
A To witness a blood draw on an individual that had 
been involved in an accident. 
Q Now, when you arrived there, what did you discover? 
A Well, I asked the nurse where the individual was, 
I had received the name from Trooper Popelmayer, and the nurse 
pointed out the room that the individual was in, and I went 
in and placed the individual under arrest, read him the 
admonition, and I waited for the blood technician to arrive. 
Q What observations did you make about the individual? 
A That he had been injured, and that he was under 
care in the hospital. 
Q And is that individual you arrested present in 
Court today? 
A Yes. He is. 
Q Would you please point him out and describe what 
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wearing. 
A He's at the defense table, the ind 
k tie. 
reflect 
you 
Q 
ividual with the 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, may the record | 
the witness has identified the defendant? 
THE COURT: The record will so reflect. | 
(By Mr. Updegrove) And I'm sorry, 
were given? 
A 
Q 
persona 
him, 
know 
J ust 
A 
he 
/ J 
— J 
BY MR. 
the 
Q 
Mr. Passey. 
And did you make any observations 
lly, other than that he was injured? 
No, I didn't. At the time that I 
had an oxygen mask on and he had an 
ust was under care, so I didn't talk 
ust to hear his response when I read 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thank yo 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
LONG: 
Trooper Hogan, when you arrived at 
first thing that you did, I believe, was 
arrest? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
After I found out where he was at? 
Right-
That 's correct. 
And you immediately read him the . 
19 
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about him | 
first observed 
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I would guess ma 
i after the blood 
rights 
Q 
1 whatfs 
last ye 
A 
Q 
and asked 
Do you 
known as 
iar? 
Yes. 
Do you 
I understand you 
arrest, then you 
your response? 
A I don1 
response. 
Q 
did." 
A 
Q 
A 
to say 
Well, 
I don' 
Would 
We'd h 
exactly w 
had been d 
him if he 
remember 
from the time you gave him the .08 1 
him the Miranda warnings? : 
ybe 15 minutes. I waited until J 
rawn before 1 gave him the Miranda 
1d answer questions. 
testifying in this matter at the— 
a per se hearing back on December 10th of 
I do. 
remember 
right to 
gave him 
t remember 
your respo 
t remember 
being asked the question by me, Did 
say that you placed him under 
the .08 admonition? Do you remember 
it, I would assume it was the same j 
nse was, do you remember, "Yes, I i 
that. 
that be correct? 
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hat I said 
the transcript, I guess, in order 
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Q Then you gave him the Miranda warnings and asked him 
if he would talk to you? Do you remember your response to 
that? 
A I remember his response was that he would answer 
the questions. 
Q Do you remember your response as being "After his 
responses to each one"? 
A I don !t-~I do not understand your question. 
Q Well, do you remember being asked by m e , "You 
definitely gave him the Miranda warnings after you gave him 
the .08 admonition?" Do you remember your response as being, 
"That1s correct"? 
A I d o n ' t — I don 1 t recall exactly what my response was 
in the hearing. I have no reason to doubt that what you're 
saying is what I said. 
Q Did--did you have anything to do with filling out 
the DUI report form; or was that exclusively O f f i c e r — o r 
Trooper Popelmayer f s? 
A That was Trooper Popelmayer. 
Q But he!s written down here 2235 for the Miranda 
warnings, would that be correct? 
A I give Trooper Popelmayer a little piece of paper 
out of my notebook recording the times when I, both placed 
Mr. Passey under arrest, when the blood test took place and 
when the Miranda rights were given. 
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Q And the blood 
that correct? 
A 
Q 
I guess, 
A 
Mr. Long 
getting 
getting 
I don1t know. 
Well, that's 
after you gave 
I do not have 
, so I won't--I 
MR. 
farther afield 
test was not given until 2350; is 
I don't have that in front of me. 
20 minutes, isn't it, or 15 minutes 
him the Miranda warnings? 
that information in front of me, 
can' t — 
UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, Mr. Long's 
on the issue of probable cause, he1 
into Miranda warnings, and--
MR. LONG: Well, we're talking about 
/ 
i 
i 
1 | 
suppression of the blood test, and I think it's critical when 
he gave 
bringing 
Q 
mean, yo 
you gave 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
him the Miranda 
out and then I 
THE 
(By Mr. Long) 
u're—you're de 
him the Mirand 
warnings. That's my only point I1 
'11 drop it. 
COURT: Go ahead. 
So you don't really know, then? 
finitely telling us that—that he— 
a warnings after the test? 
That's correct. 
And not before? 
Not before. 
I see. Now, 
statement to you was, " 
A 
Q 
If I recall, 
when you talked to—to Mr. Passey, 
I fell asleep"? 
that's what he said. 
All right. And the road conditions that night, 
22 
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t h e y s l i p p e r y ? 
A I d o n ' t b e l i e v e t h e y w e r e , 
Q W a s n ' t i t s n o v ~g? 
A 1 d o n ' t r e c a l l . I d o n f t h a v e t h e r e p o r t h e r e w i t h 
me . 
Q I s e e . 
MR. LONG: No further questions. 
THE WITNESS: I—I witnessed the blood 
draw, that was my part in the investigation. 
MR. LONG: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Updegrove? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Very briefly, your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. UPDEGROVE: 
Q Did Mr. Passey agree to the blood draw? 
A Yes. He did. 
Q Did he fight or hold back from it? 
A No. He did not. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Long? 
RECROSS-EXAMINATIQN 
BY MR. LONG: 
Q Now, do you remember me asking the question, She 
arrived about—we're talking about Pam Anderson, who took the 
blood draw; she was the person who took the blood draw? 
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A That's correct. 
Q And my question to you is, "She arrived about 15 
minutes after you gave him the Miranda warnings?" You 
remember your response being "That's correct"? 
A Approximately. | 
Q So, how is it possible that she could do a blood drawl 
before she got there? 
A I don't understand your question. j 
Q Well, your testimony before under oath was, when I 
asked you, "She arrived about 15 minutes after you gave him 
the Miranda warnings?" And you said, "That's correct". 
A No. She arrived about 15 minutes after I arrived at 
the hospital. 
Q But my question to you under oath was--
A That was 15 minutes after I read him the admonition, 
the blood draw. 
Q But the question I asked you under oath, was, "She 
arrived after 15 minutes after you gave him the Miranda 
warnings?" And you said, "That's correct", didn't you? 
A Well, I must have misunderstood. I thought you meant 
after the admonition. She arrived 15 minutes after I did, at I 
the hospital, approximately. 
Upon my arrival at the hospital, I immediately 
contacted Mr. Passey and read him—placed him under arrest and 
read him the admonition. I then exited the room. When the ] 
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LONG: No further questions. 
COURT: Mr. Updegrove? 
UPDEGROVE: Nothing, your 
COURT: You can step down 
other witnesses? 
Honor. 
Thank you. 
UPDEGROVE: Not for the State 
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Honor . 
THE COURT: 1! lr. Long, any witnesses? 
MR, LONG: Could. \ ie have j i ist a brief 
recess s o I c o u 1 d 1 1 a v e a d i s c "i 1 s s i 3 I 1 .< :i 
w h e t h e r o r n o t i t w o u 1 d c o n t r i b u t e t o a n y t h i n g i £ he too.-*. * - r • * 
sta n :I? 
THE COURT recess for a moment or 
two . 
(Recess.) 
THE COURT: Mr, 1 ,ong? 
MR. L0NG: Back to the Passey case, your 
H o nor , a f t e r a d i s < E: i i s s :i 31 i, A e > e d e c i :I e d • ; E :i 1 1 :i : • E s t a i i i \ i e 
w o ii ] • :i 1 :i k e t o a r g u e t h e matte r . 
THE COI JRT i Okay Go ahead , I lr Long . 
M R . I , 0 N G : W < ] 1 , I 1: 1: l i i L 1 11 I e i: € . : \ i: e 11 l r e € 
r e a l . 1 y , m o t i o n s t h a t a r e - - p e r t a i r: t o t h i s e v i d e n t i a r y 1: I e a r i n g , 
1 ;. h e f i r s 1 t e i i I g I 1 I e i n. c 1 :i o i 1 : • I :i s in :i s s o i I 11 l e g r o I i n d s o f i i o 
p r o b a b I e c a u s e t o a r r e s t , w h i c h I t h I i I k w o u 1 d b e d i s p o s i t i v € 
I f i 1 e d f h i s s up p 1 em e n t a 1 m em. o , w e n t - -
• :j o i l e i i p a. i I :i • :1 • 31 i. e s 3 n: i e a. d d :i t :i o i I a ] r e s . • • : • - • < • 
p r e 1 1 y we 1 ] e x h a u s t e d i t , we m u s t h a v e s h e p h a r d i . : e ^ • * • • ^i , 
c a s e ; s. I t h i i ik. t i ii s :i s p r e t t y w e l l - - ^ d e : ; n : - : • e «/ on t h e 
s ub j e c t , ai id I"" i n E U I e \ o u:i : H c . • 1 • : • 
r e a d i t y e t . 
I d o n ' t know how y o u ' d l i k e t o p r o c e e d oi i 
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c o n e 1 us i on 11 1 a t 1 1 r - P a s s ey was i i n d e r t h e i n f ' i > ° n r ^ ; r.i " ; a t ' s 
• 11: I y 1 I e s e i I I:: T i : o o p e r I I o g a i i i i j: t • : • I: 1 I e I: i • :: s p i t a ] - , .: \ 
u n d e r a r r e s t f o r d r i v i ng u n d e r ishe i nf l u e n c e . 
When O f f i c e r Hoqan a r r i v e d , he d i d n ' t n o t i c|e 
i 
any indicia of i ntoxication, I guess basical.lv because of the j 
i 
fact that he was i n an oxygen tent; but he i inderstood fhat hI s ! 
i i i a i i i :I i I I:::;; > t h e r e w a s j \ i s t t :) ; i :i t r I e s s t: I: I e b ] c: r \% 1 i :i c 1: I I 
presume he did. j 
! 
So, ' .\-)i:::i r; -'..it ur.-" case ! .r^  •:. t::„ 
sut • ] act i s j: r ett^ :ie * : \ 
a l c o h o l and am a c c i d e n t i s n o t p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o a r r e s t , j 
e s p e c i a 11 y whe.n yoi i t a k e i n 1 i g h t t h e e x p 1 a n a t :i on v h i c n 
1 11: I a s s e y 1 I <i :I a t 11 i e 1 I o s p i t a 1
 Jf ; 1 :i :i c 1; I i s , 1 I e f e 11 a s 1 e e p , 
w h i c h i s a r e a s o n a b 1 e e x p 1 a n a t i o n , an d y e t O f f i c e r — 
T H E COURT: Y o u < >, i y f h e i : < >f i 5 « I e f i n., i 1 :i ^ r e • :: a • « J j 
1 aw o n t h a t ? W h a t - - \ \/ h a t c a s e s a y s 11 I a t a n o d o r o f a 1 c o h o 1 
c o up 1 e d w 1 1 h a n a c c 1 d e n t i s n o t - -
MR I > 0 N G : \ s J ] I 1 1 ) i i J 1: I l c ; t ] : o n g e s t 
c a s e i s t h e R o y b a l l c a s e i n C o l o r a d o , t l l a t ' V s t h e 6 7 2 P . 2d 1 0 0 3 . | 
THE COURT: I s n ' t t h a t t h e oi le t h a t ' s j u s t 
s :i nit,]:: J ] - f: 1 i e : d. o i • : f a ] c c 1 io ] ? 
MR. I JONCJ : m u . e r e ' • an a c c i d e n t :i n v o l v e d 
t h e r e , t o o , I b e J i e ^  T e . R o y b a 11 e s t a fa J i s h e s t h a t i n v o 1 1; ? e m e n t 
:i i i a c a r a c c I d e i I t a i: I d a i I o d o i: o f a 1 c o 1 i o 1 d :i d n o t e s t a b 1 i s h 
p r o b a b l e cause? . Then I t h i n k a l l t h e s e o t h e r c a s e s a r e ~ ~ 
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basically are very close, to the point, but not exactly on 
point, but I — I think they're all pretty persuasive that those 
two issues by themselves just don't quite cut the mustard for 
probable cause to arrest. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Updegrove? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Yes, sir. We have a 
situation where a trained Highway Patrol Trooper, the—there 
is no—there are no other accidents going on at the time, 
indicating that there's nothing wrong with the road. I don't 
believe the—Trooper Hogan, of course, couldn't remember the 
road condition because he was at the hospital, but I believe 
Trooper Popelmayer said there were no real problems with the 
road conditions. 
We just don't have an accident. We have 
somebody going off, way off to the right of the highway, 
knocking off part of a highway sign, going through a chain 
fence, and ending up in a canal next to a culvert. When an 
officer sees something of this nature and he smells the odor 
of an alcoholic beverage, he stated an alcoholic beverage. Anc 
he also investigated by talking to the witnesses, and the 
witnesses' statements were—were corroborated by the evidence 
he saw on the ground. 
When an officer or a highway patrol 
trooper sees something that is a significant accident, for no 
real particular reason that he knew at the time, 'cause he 
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1 i a d i i' 1 h e a r d a n y t h i n g a b o i 11 t h e i n d i v i d u a 1 s a y i n g I - - I f e 11 
a s 1 e e p b e c: a i i s e ; 1 i e 1: a.< 1 1 I ' 1 1 a ] k e d 1 c • t • 1 i e ci e f e n d a i 11 a I I 1 e s c e r i, e , 
he sees a significant accident for no reason and smells odor 
of an a 1 coho 1 i c beverage, that i s certain 1"(: ? probab 1 e cause to 
arres t and as k It :>] : = i I: >lood s amp le . 
TIIE COURT : At what point , 
1 1 :i : U p d e g r o v e , does :i t:„ beconie enough 1 ' : f 3 
simp 1 y dri /ei i to f,. 1 i€^  shou 1 der of f,„he rOUA ...^ ^t. jpped? 
MR. U P D E G R O V E : I woaid s i " :' :.e -ust 
I r o ,/ e o f f t : t h e s h o i 11 d e r o f t h e r o a :I a: k i i11 
and the of fi cer came up there, and got the fellow out and had 
a f j e 1 d s ob r :i e t y test, yo u could go from there. But I iere, 
y : i i 1 Pin rei I f t 
THE COURT: Y e a h , b u t t h e r e , y o u ' d h a v e 
t h e f i e l d s ob r i e t y t e s t s t h e n a s a n e x t r a i n d i c i a - -
I II 1 I ] P DE GRC » / E : " r I: la t'" s r i ght , . J;:.cre 
no possibi1i t y o f a f ie1d sobrie ty test here, because the 
i n,dI ^  T idua 1 is bei ng Li f eF1 i ghted o\ 11: „; the of f i cer 1 ias t,„o make 
a decision at the scene. And i i i his experience, because of 
the type of an accident, talking to witnesses and smelling the 
o d • ::> r :: • f a i I a 1 < :: o 1 l o 1 :i c b e ^  T e r a g e , 
11 i a t:„ 11 n i e , :i f 1 le b e 1 i e v e s that: - h e i *_ .a p:-jod>-^ z J. u ^
 t 
a r r e s t, i s t. o a r r e s t... I I e c a n ! t d o a n y f i e 1 d sobriety test: s 
P n d h e I o e s n * I : m a 1 c e 1:„. h e d e c i s i c n a s t • : a r i : e s f i i i ::j I: h i' i m l i ' , 
11 i, a t f s b e I n g' LI f e F L i g 1 11 e d , i tf s n o t J i k e h e can g e t a n 
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ambulance or follow the ambulance, the individual's being 
LifeFlighted out, he has to make a decision. 
And because of the significant nature of 
the accident and the smell of an alcoholic beverage, I believe 
virtually any officer in this State would make the decision to 
arrest and ask for a blood test. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't have any 
question that what the officer did wasn't reasonable; the 
question is as to the probable cause. If all you have is an 
accident, I'll, say one that's not nearly as bad, you have an 
odor of alcohol; is that enough to make an arrest? 
If the person, for example, refuses to 
perform field sobriety tests--
MR. UPDEGROVE: Well, then— 
THE COURT: — i s the odor of alcohol and 
an accident simply enough by itself? 
degree, your Honor 
the officer's 
accident. An 
degree of the 
the 
don 
do. 
MR. 
, and 
UPDEGROVE: 
we have to 
experience and look 
offic :er, 
THE 
accident 
influence? I mean, 
t have alcohol invo 
I'm sure, i 
COURT: Uh 
have to do 
there are 
Well, I think it's a 
base--we have to look at 
at the degree of the 
f he s e e s — 
huh, but what does the 
with whether he's under 
terrible accidents that 
lved and there are terrible ones that 
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MR. UPDEGROVE; W e l l , s i r , we h a v e a s i n g l e ] 
CCLJL a c c i d e n t h e r e . 
A . 1 .. 
Nil, i. uUK i ' : MII Mini. 
y.l hPDEGROVE: We h a v e a s i n g l e c a r 
: • r,"<i fM.t I, ) IOIJ'1 r e a s o n t h n t ' n i f f i M I 
.L :., JA:^ . T h u r o i s - - L h e r o a d s w o a i d n 1 ' c a u o i 
j c c i - i . T . t * - h e r c ' - :o o t h e r c a r a a t h e w a s a w a r e o f , h e 
- — T l I f t h t " |i 'M ] d f'T! t i M i l f I r »'] f U I I 
: >
 4 ..:: , a : :.*_• s i r i e i i s a l c o h o l , l i e — h a , a t t h a t p o i n t , 
'*->!:• •-•-• T - r r o b a b l o c a u s e +~o a r r e s t t h i s 1 n d i v i d n i] 
: . I M. 1 ! t i I ( i 1 J 1 i I I 1 III . I I . I C 1 I .. O l i I L < ' I y I M S 1 
; : J O c a o 1; c i j u r e d , I c a n do n o t h i n g e l s * a t jc a u s e 
CIIJL^ L l m t : . 
-:• r . a u a i ; c . a rit 
Tn mw experience, r^r no good reason, a 
.
 J
 ao end; .: .c-'ohca . the of ficer—Troc 
ir orobable cause, a serious accident IMI 
A.w gece reason with !••> smell of alcohol. 
in : ! . : >f f 
I , i q i . H ! , 'j :i 1 i I y ::> i 1 1 : I I o i i c: • :i : I m e a i l., 11 l e • i e a J c ; 
e n d e r - b e n d e r s w i t l l o u t a I c o h o 1 ; b u i t i i i s i s a 
: r j i e o ^ r
 U J • J e n t . Why d:i < I i t : h a p p e n ? 
Tl IE 101 ]RT : Dc ;y i i 
• aid support that? 
M R m UPDEGROVE : No, si r , I don,l t have r i u tJ 
MII me. 
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No, 
just in case your Honor 
Popelmayer radioing 
hospital, State-
does at the request 
of law enforcement, 
him do it himself, 
the one other thing I wanted to say, 
is thinking about the—Trooper 
to Trooper Hogan to arrest him at the 
THE 
of < 
i 
COURT: I've concluded that what he ; 
Dther officers is just an extension I 
that's—thatfs not the sticky point. 1 
MR. 
THE 
or h< 
MR. 
basically the argument, 
no good reason and 
cause to arrest, to 
draw and--
blood draw? 
arrest an individua 
blood draw. 
statutes. 
the i 
— be< 
THE 
MR. 
UPDEGROVE: State v, Ramirez came- out— 
COURT: There's no magic about having 
aving somebody else do it. 
UPDEGROVE: But that's—that's 
sir; the severity of the accident for 
smell of alcohol, that's probable 
:ause he must arrest to get the blood 
COURT: Why must you arrest to have a 
UPDEGROVE: Well, they're required to 
1 before they can submit them to an— 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: They can't— 
UPDEGROVE: --intoxilyzer test or a 
COURT: Why are they required to? 
UPDEGROVE: I believe it's in the 
3J 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
THE COURT; I thi nk they1 re al lowed to, 
t ; ; 1 1 y a i: a 11 i e y r e q 1 i :i r e i t • : ": C a i 1""' t 11 I e y j i i s t a s 1 : t i I e 
person? And i i I this case , didn" t- he just simply ask the 
person if he wouldn't -;;ubnut? 
MR. U'H)KORO' 'I, i W e l l , oi course, now 
~ r o o p e r P o p e Im, aye r d i d n ' t g e t v e r y c 1 o s e t o t h e i n d i v i d u a 1, h e 
" t c 1 o s e e n o \ i g h , t o w a r d s f: h e f e e t, t c • s i n e ] ] t II: I e • 11 i i c 1 1 o i 
_coi loli c beverage. If t\ ieyf re going to LifeFliqlU, an 
.ndividual, Trooper Popelmayer, in this case, does not have a 
: e a !:: • :i s a J : f t :i n i e t : s a, ] > :> ] i: a;; < • :j i i y s J e t '*' s s t o p - -
THE COURT; B u t — b u t d i d n ' t . O f f i c e r H o g a i I 
A s k h i m i t: h c w o u 1 d s u b m i t a t t h e h o s p i t a I ? 
Mi1 UPHEGROVI V I J id. 
THE COURT: So, why is it--why i s the 
question of arrest an important one? 
MR I JPDEGROV E: 1 ^ +- ™e look at the 
statute, sir, I coul d almost swear there a:- some magic words 
j_n there. 
THE COURT: Now , :i f t h e r e 1 s a q u e s t i o n of 
a r r e s t a nd w h a t - - 1 f he r e f u s e d . 
MR I J P D E G RO VE : : , I ] 6 14 ] 0 I : • ( i ,  1 
THE COURT i Just c i momei it. 
Okayl 
MK 11 rHH^". !^ »VI' i 1 »ii i ulifKJ t t i g i a | j l i 
^'a) it says if a person has been placed under arrest and 
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there's been a question b>y a peace officer to submit, the—the 
forms that the officers work off--
THE COURT: Okay. Well, that says if he's 
been placed under arrest and has been requested, and this has 
to do with the refusal and the effect on his driver's license. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: That's true. 
THE COURT: Mr. Long is arguing that the 
arrest is invalid. And I'm argu—I'm asking you if the arrest 
is necessary and you seem to be telling me that it is. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Well, I—maybe I should 
back off here and look at it a little more carefully. I see 
what your Honor is getting at. 
Let me look at 44, here. Okay. Okay. 
44-5 — 
THE COURT: What--I ask, Mr. Updegrove, 
the question, what's the difference between this and if the 
officer decides not to make an arrest, but simply says, will 
you come down and prove to me that you're not under the 
influence? He clearly doesn't have to do, he's not under 
arrest, but if he says yes, and goes down; is that invalid? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: No, sir, I guess it 
wouldn't be. I--maybe I'm becoming a creature of procedure 
here. 
In looking at it, I don't—I don't see 
anything that states here that requires that they be arrested 
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prior to be subjected to. a test. 
THE COURT: And that's the way it normally) 
is, but I don't know of a requirement- j 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Yes, sir. And if that's ; 
the case, then we could argue that Mr. Passey voluntarily ! 
submitted to a--a blood test. And was not forced to take a i 
blood test. | 
! 
THE COURT: Mr. Long? I 
| 
MR. LONG: Well, 1 don't know that that's I J 
the issue, it seems to me the issue is, he gave him the .08 j 
admonition, which tells him, if you don't submit to this test, j 
you may lose your license to drive. So, isn't he then lying 
to the guy, he's just using this as a pretext to force him to | 
i 
take the test, instead of just coming and saying, we don't 
have any reason to--to you know, place you under arrest, but 
we're asking you if you'd voluntarily submit to a test. 
There's no—you know, if you refuse, there's no ramifications, 
gives him a choice; but to come up and say, hey, look, we're i 
going to ask you to take a test, and if you refuse to take thatj 
test, you're going to lose your license. That colors the 
whole choice for the defendant, doesn't it? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: When you look--I!m sorry, j 
When you look at 41-6-44.10, Subparagraph 1(a) when it talks 
about the implied consent law, administered at the direction 
of a peace officer having grounds to believe that the person 
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having been operating or. in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited or under the influence of alcohol; then my ! 
argument, if therefs any--I--Ifd push-- j 
i 
THE COURT: Do you have a copy of the 
admonition that read to him? j 
OFFICER HOGAN: Yes, sir. Right here. j 
It's right here with the test. j 
THE COURT: As I understand it, the ! 
officer requested him to take a blood test and then, after he j 
consented, he gave the admonition; is that in fact the way 
that it occurred, or were the admonitions before the consent? 
OFFICER HOGAN: I'm sorry, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Was the admonition that's 
included in here, it says results indicating .08 grams or 
more by weight, was that admonition given before his consent 
or after his consent? 
OFFICER HOGAN: No. Then you have the 
next—right underneath the admonition, it says, "What is your 
response to my request that you submit to a chemical test?" 
That's the response. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you gave the 
admonition before— 
OFFICER HOGAN: That's correct. 
THE COURT: --he gives a yes or a no 
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answer to that request? 
OFFICER HOGAN: That's correct. j 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: And procedurally, I think j 
I see, probably, why they do what they do, because of the ' 
fact they make sure they're aware that they understand if j 
they don't submit to a chemical test, then they could lose j 
their license for a year. ; 
MR. LONG: I believe the State vs. Cruz, j 
Dick Leedy and Galen Ross took a case to the Supreme Court and j 
I believe that case held the proposition that unless the •; 
person was placed under arrest, they could not introduce the ] 
results of the chemical test, unless they established that he 
was placed under arrest first. And I believe that's why all j 
the DUI report forms have this as the first—the first require-
ment is that they—they tell him he's under arrest. j 
THE COURT: I--the normal procedure is, 
you don't get somebody down to the station to take the test j 
j 
unless'they're under arrest. j 
MR. UPDEGROVE: That's right. | 
THE COURT: In this case, he wasn't going j 
anywhere. They could offer the test right where he was and J 
i 
he could give his consent or refusal. 
I'm going to rule that the arrest per se 
is without probable cause, but I'm going to find that the test J 
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was properly done with consent, informed consent, indicating 
that he could lose his license if he did not do that. He 
indicated that he was, he was--the officer had told him he 
was under arrest, but he was not in handcuffs, was not in a 
police station, obviously was not going anywhere, and the 
police officer, obviously was not taking him anywhere at the 
moment. 
The normal aspects of coercion that are 
inherent in questioning in a police station are not present, 
it was done in the hospital, the hospital personnel around, 
if he had said no, I don't want the test taken, nothing worse 
would have happened to him, there were no threats made, I 
think it was a voluntary consent. 
I'm going to deny the motion to suppress 
it because of a voluntary consent, although I find that I — 
there was not probable cause for an arrest, simply upon the 
basis of an accident together with an odor of alcohol. 
So, let's see if the Court of Appeals 
agrees with me or not, but I think odor and accident is 
insufficient, and I don't think it makes a difference whether 
the accident was serious or whether it's simply a routine 
traffic stop; the odor of alcohol and a minor fender-bender 
is not enough, by itself, to arrest somebody and take them 
down to jail, it's not enough to arrest them anywhere. But I 
think the consent was given voluntarily, and therefore, it's 
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admissible. 
Mr. 
MR. 
issue of the motion to < 
Apparently they 'd found 
out in the evidentiary ] 
Bud can, unopen 
suppressed? 
a — 
Long? 
LONG: 
! 
Maybe we should address this ! 
suppress the physical evidence found. | 
some evidence here that didn't come ; 
bearing 
1 
I mean, what they allegedly found was one 
ed, 12-ounce. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
LONG : 
COURT: 
t 
! 1 
i 
And why--why should that be
 ( 
i 
Well, it's not open. It's just j 
So, what—you're talking about 
relevance and weight, you're not talking about a motion to 
suppress then. 
carrying around 
MR. LONG: Well, there's no law against 
cont--full containers of alcohol in your car. | 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
LONG: 
anything to do with this case. 
to suppress. 
being consumed. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
LONG : 
COURT: 
So why should I suppress it? 
Well, because it doesn't have i 
I'm going to deny the motion 
There's no evidence it was 
They're entitled to use 
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whatever they want if you donft have a reason to keep it out. 
MR. LONG: The other—the only one left, 
I guess, is the motion to suppress the officer's testimony 
regarding the alleged indicia of intoxication, and all we j 
have really, is his testimony that he smelled the odor of an j 
alcoholic beverage at the foot of the-- j 
THE COURT: Why should that be suppressed? 
MR. LONG: --ambulance.. « 
Because thatfs all it is, it's just bare— 
bare bones, I smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage at the. 
foot of the ambulance. 
THE COURT: Okay. But that's still not a 
legal reason to suppress the testimony. 
MR. LONG: Well, I mean--
THE COURT: And it may not prove—be 
enough to prove anything, but that's not enough—you can't 
suppress just 'cause you don'c like it. 
MR. LONG: All right. 
THE COURT: I'm going to deny that motion | 
to suppress. 
MR. LONG: And any--since there was no 
other indicia of intoxication mentioned by either officer, 
then they won't be allowed to testify as to any at the trial? 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to tell 
you that there was or wasn't, I don't know that. And I'm not | 
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going to tell him what he can testify to, he's under oath to 
tell the truth. 
MR. 
MR. 
your officer in uniform 
MR. 
motions, do you want to 
THE 
MR. 
the Court's file before 
THE 
MR. 
LONG: All right. No further— 1 
UPDEGROV'7: Well, Larry, how about \ 
and-- j 
LONG: Yeah. We have these procedural 
rush through those? j 
COURT: Let's do them all. j 
LONG: We have the one to look through j 
proceedings commence. j 
COURT: Tell me what your motion is. j 
LONG: To look through the file before | 
the proceedings commence. That's-- 1 
THE 
MR. 
officer would write thi 
COURT: Why? j 
LONG: Well, because oftentimes, the 
rigs on the citation that are not 
supposed to be there, and they--
THE 
that. It's set for jur 
MR. 
COURT: The jury's not going to have j 
y trial, isn't it? | 
LONG: I know, but it may have some 
bearing on coloring your — your Honor's perception of what 
happened, since it's not introducable evidence under the Rules i 
of Evidence. 
THE COURT: I'm going to deny the motion. 
I don't have any problem if you want to look through it, but 
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I'm not 
has to 
look th 
testify 
going to say as 
be submitted for 
a matter of law that the Court file 
your inspection; but if you want to 
rough it, I don't have any problem with that. i 
i 
MR. 
And 
in their street 
THE 
MR. 
LONG: Okay. Fine. 
then the one to have the officers 
clothes. 
COURT: Why? 
LONG: Well, because it 
| 
just enhances j 
their credibility, at least they think, and so they wear ] 
| 
their uniforms to testify. 
they're 
duty ag 
on the 
street 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: Mr. Updegrove? 
UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, 
on duty and they—when they leave Court 
ain. I think it 
i 
1 
1 
I 
1 
sometimes 
, they go on 
would be very burdensome to put them 
requirement to put on their uniform and--
clothes, testify 
into their uniform. 
the def 
standin 
, and go back somewhere < 
I see nothing that would be 
endant's case by 
-or put on 
and change 
prejudicial to ! 
having the officer in uniform. He* 
g up there, or sitting on the stand, say 
a member of the Utah Hie 
make if he's in uniform 
ghway Patrol. What diff 
or not? And I think it 
unnecessary burden to put on them t o — 
compel 
THE COURT: I'm going to de 
them to appear in street clothes because 
12 
ing that he's 
erence does it 
would be an 
ny the motion tc 
Mr. Long1s 
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basis for that was the o.fficer thinks it enhances his 
credibility, and that's not a reason to refuse to let him do 
it. 
MR. LONG: And then I have a motion in 
limine in allow unrestricted closing argument; I donft mean 
unrestricted, but could 1 have 45 minutes for a closing 
argument? 
THE COURT: If the evidence warrants it. 
It depends on what—I'm not going to give you a 45-minute 
argument on a ten-minute trial. 
MR. LONG: Well, could we then at least 
discuss it outside the presence of the jury? 
THE COURT: I've always let you do it that 
way before. 
MR. LONG: Great. And then I have a motion 
in limine to prohibit the prosecution from requesting the 
Court excuse subpoenaed witnesses and officers at the 
conclusion of their testimony, and I don't mind if they do it 
as long as the jury isn't present when they make that motion. 
THE COURT: Why? 
MR. LONG: Well, it makes me look like a 
schnook when I say I need them for later, or I may need them 
for later. I don't mind if he asks outside the presence of 
the jury. 
THE COURT: Oh, I don't think that 
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influences the jury one way or another, and lfm not going to 
parade the jury in and out of here after every witness to let ! 
you do that. • 
MR. LONG: Well, we could probably— 
THE COURT: And it needs to be done on the
 ; 
record so that your objections one way or another are 
preserved. You can up to the bench and do it, I don't have i 
any problem with that; but I'm not going to parade the jury 
in and out just so that you don't look—you're afraid that 
i 
you don't look like a nice guy because you don't want to let i 
them go. j 
MR. LONG: And I have a motion in limine j 
to have the Court take judicial notice of the "Know your Limit i 
Blood Alcohol Content Card." j 
THE COURT: To have the who take notice 
of that? J 
MR. LONG: You, as judicial notice. i 
THE COURT: And what is that going to do? j 
i 
It's a bench—I mean, it's a jury trial. I 
! 
MR. LONG: That's true, yeah; but if you j 
take judicial notice of it, then I don't have to lay a j 
foundation for introducing it as evidence. Otherwise, I have J 
to get somebody from the State over here to establish that they! 
do in fact issue these through the Department of Motor j 
Vehicles and Utah Highway Patrol. 
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THE COURT: Well, judicial notice is not something 
simply that me, as an individual is aware of, but which is 
common knowledge and is legally acceptable, and I don't think 
that meets the standard. Twenty-four hour day, or 29 days 
this month or something, I'll certainly take judicial notice 
of that; but if it's something that I know as an individual, 
that someone else may not, then that's not properly grounds 
for judicial notice, and I'm going to deny that motion. 
MR. LONG: And then we have a motion in 
limine to prevent the arresting officer from refreshing his 
memory from the DUI report form until independent recollection 
is established, pursuant to Rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to tell him 
can't—not look at his report ahead of time. 
MR. LONG: And a motion in limine to—for 
advanced ruling on grounds for objections; in other words, 
I'm just saying, could we have a little conference before the 
trial begins to establish what--what grounds we'll have for 
objecting during opening and closing arguments? 
THE COURT: You want to establish ground 
rules to object for opening and closing arguments? 
MR. LONG: Yes, uh huh. 
THE COURT. Why is this any different than] 
any other trial? 
MR. LONG: Well, I don't know that it 
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will be. I've just had difficulty in the past with prosecuting 
attorneys and never with Mr. Updegrove or anyone from his 
office, for that matter 
many times that I might 
statement. 
THE 
, interrupting my opening statement so 
as well not even have an opening 1 
i j 
COURT: Well, if they get out of line, s 
i 
I'll tell them they're out of line and I'm not afraid to tell \ 
i 
the jury that somebody's out of line. 1 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
motions. 
THE 
MR. 
my motions, your Honor. 
THE 
the State? 
MR. 
THE 
looks like we've bumped 
Mr. 
LONG: All right. 1 
COURT: I'm going to deny that motion, I 
LONG: I think that concludes all my ' 
COURT: Anything else? j 
LONG: I believe that concludes all 
COURT: Mr. Updegrove, anything from 
UPDEGROVE: No, sir. Set it for trial.! 
COURT: Is this already set? It 
for the (inaudible). 
Updegrove, how long will you need to 
have your witnesses noticed to be here? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor, I've generally 
found two weeks are critical. 
THE COURT: Okay. Set it March 6th at 
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9:00. Mr. Long, is that going to fit your calendar? 
MR. LONG: I have a motion hearing in the 
afternoon, but I think I can talk Judge Griffiths into bumping 
that to a new date. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I'm sorry. I have a—a 
felony trial starting on the 4th. 
THE COURT: Who's going to cover this for 
you, then? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: I could possibly go in to 
Friday, easily, it could be a three-day. You're--I understand 
what you're saying then. 
THE COURT: Is there somebody from your 
office who would handle this? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: Mr. Parker handled the 
last one, I could probably get Mr. Parker to. So that would 
be March 6th. 
THE COURT: Otherwise, we're off to the 
20th, and I've got a notice in the prosecutors want to be out 
of town on that day? 
MR. UPDEGROVE: The 20th? 
THE COURT: Some sort of conference. 
MR. LONG: That's the—that's the DUI 
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1 conference down in St. George. 
2 THE COURT: Maybe Mr. Long doesn't want 
3 you to go to that conference before you do his trial. 
4 MR. LONG: That's exactly right, your 
5 Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Do it on the 6th? 
7 MR. LONG: I haven't received my invita-
8 tion, your Honor, yet. I'm not sure he's certain about that 
9 day. 
10 MR. UPDEGROVE: March 6th, sir, at 9:00. 
11 THE COURT: At 9:00. 
12 Mr. Long, you'll discuss with Mr. Passey 
13 so that he understands that if you cancel this trial without 
14 notice the day before, I'll assess jury costs to him. So, 
15 Mr. Passey, you need to be in touch with your attorney, 
16 especially the day before, because if for some reason, the 
17 State makes Mr. Long or you an offer that you can't refuse, 
18 come in the morning set for trial and the jury is sitting 
19 here and you decide to accept that offer, I'll assess you the 
20 costs of the jurors sitting here. So, whatever decision you 
21 make, you need to do it at least the day before. Make sure 
22 Mr. Long can get in touch with you in the event that some-
23 thing unusual happens, and you get an offer that you think is 
24 to your advantage. That will save you several hundred dollars, 
25 if you decide to do it that way. 
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A n y t h i n g e l s e , g e n t l e m e n , t h a t we n e e d t o 
d o ? 
MR. LONG: I d o n ' t b e l i e v e s o , y o u r H o n o r . 
MR. UPDEGROVE: N o , s i r . 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Passey, if you'll 
see the clerk, she'll give you a notice for that. 
MR. LONG: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Long, let me tell you, I 
appreciate your cutting that argument to about three hours 
shorter than normal, and that certainly will make a difference 
on the reception to the arguments. I appreciate your getting 
to the point on those. 
MR. LONG: Well, thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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APPENDIX 2 
State v. Sterger 
122 Utah 808 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Utah State Prison, a term to run consecu-
tively to and at the end of any and all 
determinate sentences imposed in federal 
court, with the limitation that all sentences 
cannot exceed thirty years. 
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Michael Allen STERGER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 900078-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 6, 1991. 
Defendant brought motions to sup-
press evidence consisting of controlled sub-
stances, drug paraphernalia and sample of 
defendant's, blood which was obtained fol-
lowing automobile accident. The Sixth Dis-
trict Court, Garfield County, Don V. Tibbs, 
J., denied the motions. Defendant appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held 
that: (1) inventory search of defendant's 
automobile was authorized and legal, but 
(2) remand was required to allow for taking 
of findings of fact concerning issue of vol-
untary consent. 
Affirmed in part, remanded in part. 
1. Criminal Law e=>1130(5), 1178 
Court would not consider whether in-
ventory search of defendant's vehicle vio-
lated Utah Constitution, where defendant 
failed to brief or argue state constitutional 
guarantees in either pretrial hearing or on 
appeal. 
2. Criminal Law <s>1158(4) 
Findings of fact supporting trial 
court's decision on motion to suppress are 
reviewed under clearly erroneous standard. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a). 
3. Searches and Seizures <s=*66 
Failure to offer defendant opportunity 
to make arrangements for his car does not 
eliminate justification for conducting inven-
tory of car, or render inventory illegal. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures <S=>60 
Deputy sheriff was justified in taking 
defendant's car into custody following acci-
dent, where front windshield of car was 
shattered, car was inoperable and blocking 
road in remote area, all of car's occupants. 
had been taken for medical attention and 
there was no opportunity to ask defendant 
what he wanted done with car. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
5. Searches and Seizures <s=>58, 66 
Inventory searches meet the need to 
protect individual property in police custo-
dy, protect police against claims of loss or 
theft of property, and detect dangerous 
conditions of instrumentality within im-
pounded vehicles. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
4. 
6. Searches and Seizures <s=*66 
Police officer was authorized to exam-
ine and inventory contents of defendant's 
vehicle, where officer was authorized to 
take custody of defendant's vehicle after it 
was involved in accident and all of vehicle's 
occupants were taken for medical atten-
tion. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
7. Searches and Seizures £^66 
Bifurcated inventory search of defen-
dant's vehicle was legally justified, even 
though there was time lapse of at least one 
day between impounding of defendant's ve-
hicle and time inventory was completed, 
where initial search was performed contem-
poraneously with impounding, and invento-
ry was completed at later time because 
remoteness of area required deputy sheriff 
to prioritize his duties, which meant remov-
ing victims for medical care, getting defen-
dant's blood drawn, and, arresting and 
transporting defendant. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 4. 
STATE v. STERGER 
Cite aa 80S P^d 122 (Utah App. 1991) 
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•&. Searches and Seizures <s=>66 
Where there is initial search performed 
contemporaneously with impounding of ve-
hicle, and second search conducted after 
vehicle has been impounded, both parts of 
search are legally justified. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
9. Searches and Seizures <5=>65 
Deputy sheriff did not improperly se-
lectively open containers in inventory 
search of defendant's vehicle; deputy testi-
fied he opened all closed containers in ve-
hicle except sealed cans of food. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
14. Searches and Seizures <s=>194 
Determination of whether defendant 
voluntarily consented to blood test could 
DOC rest simply on trial court's observation 
trat defendant submitted to the test; State 
mast meet its burden of proof on consent 
issue. 
II. Automobiles <£=>418 
Implied consent statute was not appli-
cable where defendant was not placed un-
der arrest prior to his blood being drawn. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10, 41-6-44.10(l)(a). 
Phillip L. Foremaster, St. George, for 
defendant and appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen., and 
Pan R. Larsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
Giy, for plaintiff and appellee. 
OPINION 
Before BENCH, JACKSON and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the 
tnal court's denial of two motions to sup-
press evidence consisting of controlled sub-
stances, drug paraphernalia and a sample 
oi defendant's blood which was obtained 
following an automobile accident. 
Defendant seeks review of the following 
issues: (1) whether the inventory search of 
his automobile was authorized and legal 
under the existing circumstances; (2) and 
whether the sample of his blood was legal-
ly taken. We affirm as to the evidence 
obtained during the inventory search and 
remand as to the blood sample. 
FACTS 
On July 23, 1989, the vehicle in which 
defendant, his wife and two passengers 
were riding, left the road and collided with 
an embankment. The accident took place 
in a remote area of eastern Garfield Coun-
ty, Utah. Defendant left the vehicle and 
went for help. A helicopter transported 
defendant's wife and the two passengers to 
a hospital in Page, Ariz-ona. Prior to leav-
ing the accident site, one of the passengers 
accused defendant of being drunk and 
causing the accident. The other passenger 
died en route to the hospital. Defendant, 
who appeared to be the least injured was 
transported to the Bullfrog Clinic, a nearby 
medical facility. 
Deputy Shawn Draper of Garfield Coun-
ty arrived shortly after the accident. After 
the passengers had been transported for 
medical attention, a tow truck arrived to 
remove the inoperative vehicle from the 
road. Because the vehicle was locked, 
Draper used a "slim jim" to force open one 
of the doors. Draper then inventoried the 
contents of the vehicle. During the inven-
tory, Draper opened a camera case and 
found a film canister, which he also opened. 
He then seized a green leafy substance 
found inside the canister, believing it to be 
marijuana. After discontinuing the inven-
tory, Draper had the vehicle towed to his 
home in Ticaboo, Utah, where he planned 
to continue the inventory. After the tow 
truck left the scene, Draper drove to the 
Bullfrog Clinic, where defendant had been 
transported, and called the Sheriff's office 
to determine how to proceed. Draper was 
instructed to have blood drawn from defen-
dant. 
Draper told defendant he was required to 
submit to a blood test since he had been 
involved in an accident Defendant was 
not told he could refuse, and he was not 
under arrest at this time. William Patrick 
Quinn, a certified park medic, summoned 
Peter Hollis, a physicians assistant em-
ployed by the Bullfrog Clinic, to take the 
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blood. Hollis explained to defendant that 
Draper wanted the blood taken, and pro-
ceeded to take the blood. After several 
unsuccessful attempts by Hollis, Quinn lo-
cated a vein and started the catheteriza-
tion. After defendant's blood was taken, 
Draper transported him to Koosharem, 
Utah, and placed him in the custody of 
another deputy. The test revealed that 
defendant's blood alcohol level was within 
the legal limit, but traces of THC, a mari-
juana by-product were present. 
The day following the accident, defen-
dant's vehicle was towed from Draper's 
home to a state certified impound yard. 
Draper completed his inventory of the 
items in the vehicle two days after the 
accident. Draper testified that he opened 
all closed containers, except canned goods. 
In a Tupperware container, Draper found 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. He 
seized these items. All of the items found 
in the vehicle were eventually listed on an 
inventory sheet by Draper. 
At his pretrial hearing, defendant moved 
to suppress the contents of the film canis-
ter, the contents of the Tupperware con-
tainer, and the results of the blood test. 
Defendant alleged that these items were 
illegally seized. The trial court denied his 
motions and this appeal followed. 
[1] At the outset, this court must deter-
mine if defendant waived his state constitu-
tional claims. The State asserts that the 
lower court had no such arguments before 
it and therefore the issue was decided only 
under the United States Constitution. We 
agree. This court has often urged counsel, 
most recently in State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 
1268, 1272-73 (Utah Ct.App.1990), to in-
clude more than a "nominal allusion" to 
state constitutional rights in *" appellate 
briefs and arguments. In the present case, 
defendant failed to brief or argue state 
constitutional guarantees at either the pre-
trial hearing or on appeal. Accordingly, 
we decline to consider his arguments based 
on the Utah Constitution. 
1. In any case, failure to offer defendant an 
opportunity to make arrangements for his car 
does not eliminate the justification for conduct-
ing an inventory of that property, Colorado v. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[2] Findings of fact supporting a trial 
court's decision on a motion to suppress are 
reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" 
standard of Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). State v. 
Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah Ct.App. 
1991) (citing State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 
1249 (Utah CtApp.1990). 
INVENTORY SEARCH 
[3,4] Deputy Draper testified that he 
took custody of defendant's car, invento-
ried its contents, and had the car removed 
from the scene of the accident. Defendant 
first argues Draper did not have to im-
pound the car but could have left it locked 
and where it was. This assertion is with-
out merit. Defendant's car was partially 
blocking the road in a remote area where 
the accident occurred. The front wind-
shield was shattered and the car inopera-
ble. All of the occupants had been taken 
for medical attention 2nd Draper had no 
opportunity to ask defendant what he 
wanted done with the car.1 "[T]he exist-
ence or absence of justification for the im-
poundment of an automobile may be deter-
mined from the surrounding circum-
stances." State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 
454 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted). Given 
the condition of defendant's car and where 
it was located after the accident, there was 
justification for taking the car into police 
custody. 
[5, 6] Before defendant's car was towed 
from the accident scene, Draper invento-
ried its contents. Inventory searches con-
ducted under these circumstances are justi-
fied, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 
441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 
(1973), and it is well settled that such a 
search is an exception to the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment 
South Dakota v. Oppcrman, 428 U.S. 364, 
96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 LEd.2d 1000 (1976); 
State v. Earl, 716 P2d 803, 805 (Utah 
Bertine, 479 VS. 367, \W S.Ct. 738, 93 LEd.2d 
739 (1987), or render the inventory illegal. 
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). 
STATE v. STERGER 
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1986); State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 4^5, 
426 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Inventory proce-
dures meet three distinct needs: (1) to pfo-
tect individual property in police custody I 
Vl\ protect police a^&kv t^ claims of loss Qr 
then of property; and (3) detect dangerous 
conditions of instrumentality within im-
pounded vehicles. Johnson, 745 P.2d at 
454 fciting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 96 
S.Cu at 3097). Having determined rt»at 
Draper was authorized to take custody of 
defendant's vehicle, a concomitant right ex-
isted to examine and inventory its contents. 
See State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 
P.2d 517 (1968). 
Our analysis does not stop at determin-
ing that the impoundment and inventory 
search of defendant's car were justified. 
We must also determine if the search was 
conducted for inventory purposes, in a le-
gal manner, and not merely as a "fishing 
expedition for evidence." Defendant alleg-
es mat, even if an inventory search Was 
authorized, it was illegal because it was ri°t 
earned out pursuant to standardized proce-
dure^.2 
Bifurcated Inventory Searches 
[7] The Garfield County Sheriffs Pe-
panment has written procedures governing 
when the contents of a vehicle shall be 
inventoried, and how that inventory sba^ 
be carried out: 
4.05 Vehicle Inventories 
tl) Any vehicle impounded shall be in-
ventoried. A written inventory shall be 
m^de of all contents of vehicle, both in 
opened, closed and/or locked containers. 
The trunk and also any compartments 
shall be opened and the contents invento-
ried. All evidence seized in any invento-
2. Defendant states the following spec»^c 
grounds of error: (1) the inventory procedi* res 
did not provide for bifurcated searches, (2) the 
procedure for opening closed containers was 
sigaed by the tow truck driver when he assumed 
custody of the vehicle, and (4) the procedures 
do not outline when the police are to impound a 
vehicle. Because defendant fails to cite supp° r t 
or provide any meaningful analysis as to argu-
ments three and four, we decline to rule o r i 
them. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341. 
13*4 (Utah 1984). 
ry shall be placed in the evidence locker. 
Such record shall become a part of the 
case file. When custody of the vehicle 
changes from one person to another, the 
person taking custody of the vehicle shall 
also assume custody of the contents by 
placing his/her signature on the invento-
ry list. 
These procedures are silent as to how soon 
after a vehicle is impounded the inventory 
must be completed, and whether bifurcated 
searches are permitted. 
The fourth amendment requires a suffi-
cient proximity in time between the im-
poundment of a vehicle and the subsequent 
inventory search. Ex Parte Boyd, 542 
So.2d 1276, 1279, cert denied, U.S. 
, 110 S.Ct. 219, 107 L.Ed.2d 172 (1989). 
Each moment, hour or day that passes de-
tracts from a full effectuation of the objec-
tives of the inventory, namely to protect 
property. Id.3 
In the present case, there was a time 
lapse of at least one day between the im-
pounding of defendant's vehicle and the 
time the inventory was completed. How-
ever, the inventory was initiated immedi-
ately after the accident, k was completed 
at a later time because, as Draper testified, 
the remoteness of the area required him to 
prioritize his duties, and that meant remov-
ing victims for medical care, getting defen-
dant's blood drawn, arresting and trans-
porting defendant, and completing the pre-
liminary investigation of the accident. 
[8] We agree with defendant that a bi-
furcated inventory search, such as was con-
ducted here, is not specifically provided for 
in the applicable procedures. That fact 
alone, however, does not make the invento-
ry search illegal. Where there is an initial 
3. Searches with a time lapse between impound-
ment and the inventory have been upheld under 
certain circumstances. See, e.g., Rudd v. State, 
649 P.2d 791 (Okla.Crim.App.1982) (eight-hour 
'lapse due to officer "in charge o^  inventory "being 
detained by complexity of accident in which 
subject vehicle was involved); Black v. State, 
418 So.2d 819 (Miss. 1982) (officers had to spend 
time on emergency detail). 
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search performed contemporaneously with 
the impounding of a vehicle, and a second 
search conducted after the vehide has been 
impounded, both parts of the search are 
legally justified. Cf Florida v. Meyers, 
466 U.S. 380, 104 S.Ct 1852, 80 L.Ed.2d 381 
(1984) (upholding a second search conduct-
ed after vehicle was impounded); Michigan 
v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 102 S.Ct. 3079, 73 
L.Ed.2d 750 (1982) (upheld warrantless 
search even though prior inventory search 
had already been made); State v. Earl, 716 
P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1986) (warrantless 
search after automobile impounded up-
held). 
Closed Containers 
[9] Defendant also alleges that, con-
trary to the inventory search guidelines, 
Draper did not open all closed containers 
found in the vehicle. The Garfield County 
Sheriffs guidelines specifically state that 
"A written inventory shall be made of all 
contents of vehicle, both in opened, closed 
and/or locked containers." As to the open-
ing and inventorying of closed containers, 
the United States Supreme Court has stat-
ed that standardized criteria, Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S.Ct. 738, 
743, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987), or established 
routine, Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 
648, 103 S.Ct 2605, 2610-11, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 
(1983), regulate the opening of containers 
found during an inventory search. See 
also Florida v. Wells, — U.S. - — , 110 
S.Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (ab-
sent specific policies, search not sufficient-
ly regulated to satisfy fourth amendment); 
Shamblin, 763 P.2d at 427-28 (state troop-
er's opening of a zipped bag during a war-
rantless inventory search was defective in 
absence of standardized police procedures 
mandating the opening of closed containers 
during such a search). 
4. At any rate, a strict interpretation of the 
Shamblin language was tempered by the United 
States Supreme Court in Florida v. Welb, 
U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990): 
"A police officer may be allowed sufficient lati-
tude to determine whether a particular contain-
er should or should not be opened in light of the 
nature of the search and the characteristics of 
the container itself. The allowance of the exer-
cise of judgment based on concerns related to 
We are not persuaded by defendant's 
argument In Shamblin this court inter-
preted recent cases to establish "that the 
Fourth Amendment is violated when closed 
containers are opened during a vehicle in-
ventory search in the absence of a stan-
dardized, specific procedure mandating 
their opening." Shamblin, 763 P.2d at 
427-28. (Emphasis added). "With a stan-
dardized, mandatory procedure, the minis-
ter's picnic basket and grandma's knitting 
bag are opened and inventoried right along 
with the biker's tool box and the gypsy's 
satchel." Id. at 428. Draper testified that 
he opened all closed containers except 
sealed cans of food found in defendant's 
vehicle. He did not arbitrarily or selective-
ly open containers, as defendant would 
have us believe. Accordingly, defendant's 
reliance on Shamblin is misplaced.4 In 
this case, not only did standardized proce-
dures exist, but they were followed as well. 
Conclusion as to Inventory Search 
None of the arguments put forth by de-
fendant as to the inventory search, per-
suade us that the evidence obtained during 
that search should have been suppressed. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's de-
nial of defendant's motion to suppress the 
evidence found in his vehicle. 
BLOOD SAMPLE 
[10] Defendant next claims that the 
sample of his blood should be suppressed 
because it was drawn without his consent, 
and because the persons who drew the 
blood were not authorized to do so. We 
deferentially review the trial court's deter-
mination that defendant consented to the 
blood test, as is appropriate ^ yith all factual 
determinations. State zT Webb, 790 P.2d 
65, 82 (Utah Ct.App.1990).5 
the purposes of an inventory search does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. 110 S.Ct. at 
1635. 
5. We note that there is no bright-line test used 
when a reviewing court examines whether con-
sent to a search was properly obtained. Rather, 
"the question of whether a consent to a search 
was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of 
duress or coercion, express or implied, is a 
STATE v. STERGER 
Cite AS 808 PJ2d 122 (Utah App. 1991) 
Utah 127 
Defendant contends that at no time did 
he voluntarily consent to the blood test. 
He claims he acquiesced because Draper 
told him he was required to submit to a 
blood test. The State acknowledges defen-
dant was told that blood was required to be 
drawn because there had been an accident, 
and they do not dispute the inaccuracy of 
the statement. Nonetheless, they contend, 
and the trial court found, that defendant 
consented to the test twice: once after he 
was told by Draper that a sample was 
required, and again when the medical per-
sonnel present asked him to proceed with 
che sampling. 
The trial court found defendant consent-
ed simply because there was no dispute in 
che record that defendant submitted to the 
rest. However, a determination of volun-
tary consent cannot rest on such a cursory 
observation. In sustaining its burden that 
voluntary consent was given the State 
must meet its burden of proof: 
(1) There must be clear and positive tes-
timony that the consent was "unequivo-
cal and specific" and "freely and intelli-
gently given"; 
(2) the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coercion, 
express or implied; and 
(3) the courts"indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of funda-
mental constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such 
rights were waived. 
question of fact to be determined from the total-
ity of all the circumstances." State v. Marshall, 
791 P.2d 380, 887 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (quoting 
Schneckloih v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 
S.Ct. 2041, 2047-48, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). See 
also State "v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 
1990jP~(''trial court's finding of consent was 
clearly erroneous."); State v. Whittenback, 621 
P.2d 103, 106 (Utah'1980); State v. Robinson, 
797 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Webb, 790 
P.2d at 82. Federal cases addressing voluntari-
ness of consent to a search have also traditional-
ly spoken in terms of voluntary consent as a 
fact question. See, e.g., Thompson v. Louisiana, 
469 U.S. 17, 23, 105 S.Ct. 409, 412, 83 L.Ed.2d 
246 (1984) (issue of consent a factual issue); 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557, 
100 S.Ct. 1870, 1878-79, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) 
(voluntariness of consent is a question of fact); 
United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1153 
(10th Cir.1986) (defendant's consent a factual 
808 P.26--6 
State v. Webb, 790 P^d 65, 82 (Utah Ct 
App. 1990) (quoting United States v. Ab-
bott, 546 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir.1977)) (ci-
tations omitted). 
Our -examination: of the record reveals 
that the trialcourtrfai!edtO;rnake adequate 
findings of fact: concerning; the issue of 
voluntary consent Tbe trial court did not 
make any findings as to the factors out-
lined above. The record is devoid, for ex-
ample, of any discussion regarding whether 
defendant knew that he could refuse the 
test. Second, Draper told defendant such a 
test was required. Because factual issues 
are best addressed at che trial level, State 
v. Eargraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah Ct. 
App.1991), we :remand for a rehearing on 
this critical issue. 
[11] In an alternative argument, defen-
dant contends that the blood test result 
should have been suppressed because the 
blood sample was taken by persons not 
authorized to draw blood pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp.1990), the 
implied consent statute. The State re-
sponded to this argument in their brief, 
stating it was unnecessary to determine if 
Hollis and Quinn were authorized to draw 
blood, because defendant voluntarily con-
sented to the blood test, making the implied 
consent statute inapplicable. We agree 
that § 41-6-44.10 is inapplicable to the 
facts at hand, but we find it inapplicable 
for the reason that defendant was not 
placed under arrest prior to his blood being 
drawn.6 Because the implied consent stat-
finding); United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 
839 (8th Cir.1986) (consent reviewed under a 
"clearly erroneous" standard); United States v. 
Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, S92 (10th Cir.1986) (vol-
untariness of consent a finding of fact); United 
States v. Cox, 752 F.2d 741, 747 (1st Cir.1985) 
(question of consent is one of fact, not of law); 
United States v. Lopez, Til F.2d 543 (10th Cir. 
1985) (trial court's finding of fact on issue of 
voluntariness for consent cases must be accept-
ed on appeal unless clearly erroneous); United 
States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir. 
1984) (standard of review for denial of motion 
to suppress is the cleanly erroneous standard). 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(1 )(a) (Supp. 
1990) provides that a person operating a motor 
vehicle is considered to have consented to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or 
urine. This statute is applicable only to persons 
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ute is not applicable in this case, defen-
dant's claim fails.7 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court's denial of de-
fendant's motion to suppress the evidence 
found as a result of the inventory search of 
defendant's vehicle. As to the motion to 
suppress the results of the blood test, we 
remand for an examination of the volun-
tariness of defendant's consent. 
BENCH and RUSSON, JJ.f concur. 
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Suit was brought on behalf of injured 
ranch hand against co-worker who had acci-
dentally inflicted the injury. The Fifth Dis-
trict Court, Iron County, J. Philip Eves, J., 
granted summary judgment to co-worker 
and appeal was taken. The Court of Ap-
peals, Billings, J., held that: (1) co-worker 
was an "employee" of the rancher, for pur-
who have been placed under arrest. State v. 
Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 406, 446 P.2d 307 (1968) (im-
plied consent statute only applicable to persons 
who have been placed under arrest); In the 
Interest of R.LI., 771 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1989) 
(blood sample taken from motorist who was not 
under arrest, who was not informed he could 
refuse to submit to the test, and who did not 
consent thereto, was taken contrary to provi-
sions of implied consent statute and results 
therefore inadmissible); State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 
12 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (chemical test cannot be 
poses of a release executed on behalf of the 
injured ranch hand, covering rancher and 
his employees; (2) co-worker was a third-
party beneficiary under release, even 
though co-worker had given no considera-
tion for it; and f3) release was unambig-
uous, so as to preclude resort to extrinsic 
evidence that parties to release allegedly 
did not intend to include co-worker. 
Affirmed. 
1. Release <s=>29<4) 
Ranch hand who accidentally injured 
co-worker was an- "employee" of rancher, 
for purposes of a release signed by the 
co-worker covering rancher and his employ-
ees, containing h specific reservation of 
rights as to co-worker "except as he may 
be an employee -of" rancher; ranch hand 
had agreed to work for rancher for the 
summer under rancher's supervision and 
control, for a stipulated wage. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other jud:cial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Release <e=>27 
Definition of term ''employee" found 
in workers' compensation law did not apply 
to ranch hand who had injured co-worker 
and was claiming coverage under co-work-
er's release of rancher and its employees, 
even though the ranch hand was also claim-
ing that he was ^n employee for purposes 
of the exclusivity provisions of the work-
ers' compensation law. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 
et seq. 
3. Release <s=^ 27 
Release from liability in a tort action, 
which applied to named parties and their 
employees, made ranch hand who injured 
taken without driver's consent prior to arrest 
unless driver is unconscious or otherwise not 
able to give consent). 
7. Our counterpart in Oregon has addressed this 
issue on similar facts, and held that defects in 
administering sucn a test go to the weight to be 
given its results by the trier of fact, but do not 
make the results inadmissible. Gildroy v. Motor 
Vehicles Division, 100 Or.App. 538, 786 P.2d 757, 
758 (1990) (emphasis added). 
